A model of lending is presented where loans are established in matches between banks (lenders) and entrepreneurs (borrowers) who meet in a search process. Projects turn out randomly a quick payoff or a long-term payoff that requires a rollover of the loan. The model generates, under proper parameter conditions, two steady states without or with rollover, and rollover is socially inefficient. Under imperfect information, the standard debt contract with commitment is privately efficient. However, it extends the domains of equilibria with socially inefficient rollover. The absence of commitment abolishes the social inefficiency of the debt contract 3 .
Introduction
Recent crises of the financial sector (e.g., Japan, U.S., others), exhibit the accumulation of low performing loans. These loans reduce the capacity of financial institutions for lending to new projects that could stimulate growth and help bring the economy out of a protracted state of stagnation. We analyze this issue in a model with search between lenders (banks) and borrowers (entrepreneurs) and imperfect information on the part of lenders. Gale and Hellwig (1985) have shown, in a one-period model, that when it is costly for a lender to get information about the ability of the borrower to pay, the optimal loan contract is the standard debt contract, with monitoring (bankruptcy) when the entrepreneur does not pay a fixed amount that is set in the contract 4 . The debt contract shifts the payoff of the lender toward the lower part of the distribution of the investment's return, in which the costly verification (bankruptcy) takes place. In order to minimize cost, all the verified return goes to the lender.
In this paper, the random return of a project may occur over many periods and the lower part of the return's distribution, in which verification takes place, is now the distribution in the near-or short-term. The lender may lower the fixed debt payment in order to save on verification cost and get in exchange all the return from the continuation of a project with a long-term payoff and roll over the loan that supports the project. Whether to roll over or to call the loan back depends on the opportunity cost of funds. If there are many opportunities for the use of funds in new project, it may be better (in a privately efficient contract between lender and borrower) to cut short projects that don't provide a early payoff. However, the opportunities for new projects may be lower when borrowers (entrepreneurs) and lenders (banks) are tied in a relation with loan rollover. And the loan rollover may be privately efficient when the opportunity cost of funds is low. There may be multiple equilibria when investment projects start with a match between an entrepreneurs and a bank in a search process.
These effects are analyzed here in a simple model with continuous time and infinite horizon. The distinction of short-term and long-term returns of investment projects is represented by a stylized distribution: with some probability the return of the project takes place in a vanishingly short time and randomly; otherwise the return is generated by a Poisson process (Section 2). The undertaking of an investment project requires a match between a bank and an entrepreneur, and such a match is the result of a search from both sides. Here, the search technology is standard (Diamond, 1982, Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) .
The case of no verification cost (and perfect information ex ante) is analyzed in Section 3. Because of the search externality, there may be two steady state equilibria. In the first, loans are not rolled over when the investment project does not pay quickly. The amount of banks and entrepreneurs searching is large and the probability of finding a match relatively high. Hence, the continuation of a project with slow return is less profitable than breaking the match to search for a new one. In the second equilibrium, loans are rolled over, more agents are tied in a relation and the probability of finding a match is smaller. The low return of the search compared to the return of the project continuation sustains an equilibrium that is socially inferior to the first one.
In Section 4, there is a fixed cost of verification on the lender and commitment: by assumption, there is no possibility of renegotiation after verification. The standard debt contract is shown to be privately optimal. The verification cost enhances the private incentives towards the continuation of a long-term project because of two effects. First, it lowers the profitability of the search for new opportunities as compared to rolling over a loan in the continuation of a match for which the verification cost has been paid. Second, the incentive to reduce the verification cost lead to the transfer of all payoffs to the lender after verification with an additional incentive to pursue a match between the lender and the borrower in a long-term project that is privately but not socially efficient. Because of these effects, a steady state without rollover, which is socially efficient, may no longer be an equilibrium when verification is costly.
In Section 5, there is no commitment: the transfer from the lender to the borrower can be renegotiated after the verification. This absence of commitment is beneficial from a social point of view: it expands the domain of parameter values for which the steady state with no rollover is an equilibrium. Diamond (1990) analyzes a model of pairwise credit in search equilibrium. He focuses on the externalities in trades. There is no distinction between banks and entrepreneurs and all agents may be lenders or borrowers when one party in the match cannot deliver the good for immediate exchange. There is also no distinction between different project types and hence no asymmetry of information between the parties of the match.
The technology of long-term projects here is similar to the one in Hellwig (1977) , but we ignore issues related to the dynamic structure of creditor-debtor interaction that led to ambiguity in the optimal creditor behavior about the decision to terminate a loan.
This work is related to the issue of debt overhang for which other mechanisms have been analyzed in previous papers. In Lamont (1995) , a large corporate debt reduces the return of new investment because of loan seniority. Snyder (1998) studies the debt overhang problem in the context of an entrepreneurial project requiring a sequence of investments financed by an outside lender. In his model, loan commitments with a fixed payment are optimal and dominate standard debt contracts because the interest of the debt contract has an adverse effect on the effort of the entrepreneur and on the probability of success of the project. Such an effect does not appear here because the probability of success is exogenous.
The model
There are two types of agents, banks and entrepreneurs. Each type forms a continuum, of mass A for the entrepreneurs, and mass B for the banks. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume A = B. Each bank is endowed with a unit of resources that can be loaned to an entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs can undertake a project if they get a loan of one unit from a bank. Entrepreneurs and banks meet through a matching process. Banks and entrepreneurs discount their payoffs at the rates ρ and ρ , which satisfy the inequality ρ ≥ ρ.
Investment projects
When a project does not generate the returns expected at some date and its financing is not repaid as scheduled, it is possible that an extension of the time to carry on the project and its financing will bring some return. This property is stylized here by assuming that the return of an investment project is a random variable. The type of the project is selected randomly by nature and is either short-term, with probability α, or long-term, with probability 1 − α .
For simplicity, we assume that time is continuous and that the payoff of the short-term project is immediate (after the loan is granted and the project has been implemented). That payoff, z, is distributed according to a density function φ(z) which is continuously differentiable and strictly positive on the interval [0, C]. The long-term project requires the extension of the loan by the bank. Such an action will be called rolling over the loan. The output of the long-term project is determined by a Poisson process that generates once the amount y, with probability λ per unit of time. By assumption 0 < y < C.
The matching process
Let M be the mass of loans outstanding, which is also the mass of entrepreneurs on long-term projects. The mass of funds available for lending and the mass of entrepreneurs looking for a loan are equal to A − M . We assume that for a bank with a loanable fund, the probability of finding an entrepreneur is equal to µ, which is endogenous. That probability is also the probability of finding a bank for an entrepreneur who searches for a loanable fund in order to undertake a project. A standard specification in the literature 5 is that µ = ν(A − M ), where ν is a constant parameter. We do not need a specific formulation of the matching process. We simply assume that µ is an increasing function 6 of A − M .
Imperfect information
Neither a bank nor an entrepreneur knows the type of the project before it is started. The fraction of short-term project, α, is known by all agents. After the investment is made, entrepreneurs observe the type of the project and its output if it is short-term. Following the literature, it is assumed that banks observe the type of the project and its output only if they pay a cost that is assumed here to be fixed and equal to κ. The observation requires an examination of the books of the entrepreneur and is equivalent to a bankruptcy. In an actual bankruptcy, equity holders receive nothing and all that can be paid goes to the bank. We will show that this outcome is generated by the 5 See Diamond (1982 Diamond ( ), (1990 , Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , Rocheteau and Wright (2005) .
6 One could also assume that µ is constant and that there is a positive externality between the projects such that the probability that a particular project pays off quickly, (i.e. is short-term) increases with the mass of short-term projects in the economy. In the present model, this externality takes the form that the parameter α increases with the flow of new projects. (In a discrete period model where short-term projects pay off after one period, α would increase with the stock of new good projects). Since the flow is equal to αµM , the probability α is an increasing function of M .
optimal contract under imperfect information, as in the one-period model of Gale and Hellwig (1985) .
Bargaining for the terms of the loans
When a bank and an entrepreneur meet, they write a loan contract that generates a payoff S B for the borrower (the entrepreneur) and S L for the lender (the bank). It is assumed that the contract maximizes under imperfect information, the utility function U(S B , S L ), where U is a constant-returns-to-scale, differentiable, strictly quasi-concave utility function such that the marginal rate of substitution U 1 /U 2 tends to ∞ if S B /S L tends to 0 and U 2 /U 1 tends to ∞ if S L /S B tends to 0. The Nash-bargaining solution corresponds to the special case of a utility function U with unit elasticity of substitution. The bargaining solution depends only on the indifference curves and not on the cardinal properties of U, but the constant-returns-to-scale in the payoffs will provide an index to compare different equilibria.
The case of perfect information
We assume that there is no cost of observation of the output of the investment project, κ = 0. In an established match, the decision to continue a long-term project with a loan rollover or to terminate the project and let the bank and the entrepreneur search for a new match, depends on the relative payoffs of the long-term project and of the search. A contract specifies the maximum length T of the match and the contingent payments to the parties.
Let h(z) be the payment to the lender if the project produces immediately z, and δ the payment if the project produces eventually y. The payoffs of the contract to the borrower, S B , and to the lender,
where U B and U L are the utilities of the borrower and of the lender in the state of searching.
The sum of the payoffs is
is the total expected return that is generated through a short-term project, and
is the return from the continuation of the loan up to the maximum time T .
The function R(T ) is monotone in T and decreasing if and only if
This equation holds when the use of funds to continue a long-term project is less efficient than a termination of the match, after which the bank can use the fund to search for a new entrepreneur and the entrepreneur can search for a new match with a bank. The values of U B and U L depend on the state of the economy. There are two possibilities: if inequality (4) holds, no long-term project is undertaken in an equilibrium; if the inequality is reversed, the long-term project is continued until it pays off.
The surplus possibility frontier in (S B , S L ), SPF, is given by equation (2) where T = 0 or ∞ depending on whether the inequality (4) is verified. The SPF has a slope equal to −1. An optimal contract maximizes U(S B , S L ) on the SPF, and because of the symmetry and the strict quasi-concavity of the utility function, S B = S L in an equilibrium with no verification cost.
The steady state without rollover
If inequality (4) holds, no loan is rolled over, all matches are instantly profitable or fail and agents are always searching. Their utilities arê
In this case, the necessary and sufficient condition (4) for the steady state without rollover to be an equilibrium takes the form λy <μζ.
When there is perfect information about the output of a project (short-term and longterm), the distribution of the total return between the bank and the entrepreneur has no impact on the cost-benefit analysis of long-term projects. Any distribution can be achieved by a contract. The optimal decision about project continuation maximizes the total surplus from the match. The productivity of the search increases with the probability of finding a match, µ. The value of µ is highest when no match is continued for a long-term project. In that case, the rate of return of funds is equal to µ(A)α zφ(z)dz.
The steady state with rollover
By definition, in the steady state with rollover all matches last until they generate a payoff. In such a steady state, the stock of loans, M * , is determined by equality between inflows and outflows:
The left-hand side is equal to the inflow of new loans on long-term projects and is the product of the flow of new loans, (A − M * )µ * , multiplied by the share of the long-term projects, 1 − α. The right-hand side is the flow of long-term loans that are repaid when the project succeeds. Since µ(A − M ) is decreasing in M , in the steady state with rollover,
In the steady state with rollover, with T = ∞ in R(T ), the equation (2) of the SPF is
The slope of the SPF is −1, as in the previous case, and in equilibrium the surpluses of the borrower and the lender are equal. Using
, the utilities of searching agents are
The steady state with rollover is an equilibrium if and only if inequality (4) is reversed and this inequality takes here the form
To summarize the previous discussion, we introduce a notation and a proposition.
Definition 1 (threshold values of y)
Letȳ and y be defined by
λȳ =μζ, withμ = µ(A) and ζ = α zφ(z)dz, λy = µ * ζ, with µ * = µ(M * ) and M * given by (6).
It is immediate that y <ȳ. From the condition (4), using the expressions of S B and S L in (1), and of U B and U L in (5), we have the next result.
Proposition 1
Under perfect information, (i) the steady state without rollover is an equilibrium if y <ȳ,
(ii) the steady state with rollover is an equilibrium if y > y.
In the range y ∈ (y,ȳ), there are two steady state equilibria. The steady state with no rollover is superior as shown in the next result which is proven in the Appendix.
Proposition 2
If the parameters of the economy are such that there are two equilibrium steady states and the economy is in the steady state with rollover, the termination of all loans induces a jump to the steady state without rollover and an increase of the utilities of all agents.
The utilities of agents in the steady state with rollover is strictly lower because of the search externality. Fewer agents are searching because more agents are in an established match where a loan sustains the continuation of a long-term project. Such a long-term project is privately efficient in that equilibrium because of the lower opportunity cost of funds and searching. It would not be efficient in the equilibrium without rollover.
Imperfect information with commitment
In this section, once the contract is signed before the undertaking of the project, there is no renegotiation if the project turns out to be long-term. If the contract specified that the long-term project should be undertaken, the entrepreneur fulfills that obligation and remains in the match in order to "repay the debt".
Efficient contracts under imperfect information
We now assume, as in the rest of the paper, that the monitoring cost, κ, is strictly positive. A loan contract is defined by the maximum length of time, T , for the extension of the loan and the payments by the borrower to the lender before T . Note that the entrepreneur has a contract commitment to keep the project going until T unless it pays off before.
In the standard debt contract with one period (Gale and Hellwig, 1985) , after the project is realized, if the borrower pays a fixed amount, set by the contract, to the lender, there is no verification. If the borrower is unable to pay that fixed amount, there is verification and all the return goes to the lender. This transfer scheme minimizes the expected cost of verification that is borne by both parties.
In the present model, the length of time of the short-term project is reduced to zero in order to simplify and highlight the main mechanisms. In the case of the short-term project, under incomplete information, the minimum payment without verification is immediate and equal to a fixed amount b (in addition to the principal). Such a payment can be made only if the project's return is greater than b. Hence, if the borrower does not pay b immediately after the loan is granted and the investment project is implemented, there is verification.
If the output is verified, the payment is set as a function of this output. Let h(z) be the payment from the borrower to the lender when the project generates immediately z, and δ the payment when the project generates the fixed amount y through the Poisson process with parameter λ. In an optimal contract, all the post-verification payoffs go to the lender. If the borrower would retain a fraction of the payoff, the debt payment b would have to be raised to compensate the lender and the domain of values of z for which the costly verification is done would be larger. It is shown in the appendix that the argument presented in the one period model of Gale and Hellwig holds here with infinite horizon when the discount rate of entrepreneurs, ρ , is not strictly smaller than that of banks, ρ: ρ ≥ ρ.
Proposition 3
If ρ ≥ ρ, then all efficient loan contracts are debt contracts (b, T ): if the borrower pays b there is no verification by the lender; if the borrower does not pay b, the lender pays the cost of verification and gets all the return from the project ; if the project is revealed to be long-term, the loan is extended until time T , which may be 0 or infinite.
For the rest of the paper, we assume that lenders and borrowers have the same discount rate with ρ = ρ.
The steady state equilibrium with no loan rollover
We first consider a steady state where banks do not extend the time to repay the loan if the project has not succeeded in the short-term. It will be shown that under some condition, such a policy is the result of an optimal contract between banks and entrepreneurs when they meet. When no loan is rolled over, the debt contract prescribes that if the borrower cannot pay b, the lender verifies, takes whatever the project has generated, and recalls the loan if the project turns out to be long-term. The stock of loans M is therefore equal to zero and the masses of entrepreneurs and banks searching for a match are at their maximum, A. The probabilities of meeting a partner are also at their maximum, µ(A) =μ.
When a match between a bank and an entrepreneur takes place, the distribution of the total return between the two parties, the lender and the borrower, depends on the debt payment, b. When b varies, the payoffs to the lender, S L , and to the borrower, S B , vary on a payoff possibility frontier that will be characterized below. The choice of a point on the frontier will depend on the bargaining. The conditions under which any loan rollover is inefficient, and the steady state is indeed an equilibrium, will then be determined.
The surplus possibility frontier and the equilibrium
In a steady state with no rollover, loans are not extended beyond the time when the project generates a short-term return, which given the simplifying assumption of the model, is zero. Hence, entrepreneurs are always searching for a loan since short-term projects pay off immediately and no loan finances long-term projects. The payoff of the match for the entrepreneur as a borrower, and the bank as a lender, are equal to
Their sum is the return of the short-term project, which occurs with probability α, net of the cost of verification
The entrepreneur gets a payoff only if the project's return is higher than the debt payment, b. The expected value of that payment is ω(b). If the entrepreneur cannot pay b, the bank pays the cost κ and verifies. There are two possibilities: with probability α, the project is revealed to be short-term with output z < b, in which case the bank gets z; with probability 1 − α the bank gets nothing in the short-term.
When the debt payment b varies, the point of coordinates (S B (b), S L (b)) moves on a graph that defines the frontier of the payoff possibility set. The derivatives of the payoffs with respect to b are
When b increases from 0 to its upper-bound, the payoff of the borrower decreases monotonically, while the variation of the lender's payoff is ambiguous. The payoff possibility frontier can be defined by S L as a function of S B . An example where the density φ is constant is represented in Figure 1 .
The payoff possibility frontier is continuously differentiable with a derivative equal to
The function θ(b) will play an important role. It arises because of the incentive to save on the verification that depends on the density φ(b) around the debt payment.
The slope of the payoff possibility frontier is smaller than one, in absolute value. In the optimal contract, because the utility function U(S B , S L ) is symmetric, the surplus of the borrower is higher than that of the lender. In a neighborhood of κ = 0, the optimal debt payment and the payoffs of the borrower and the lender in equilibrium are continuous functions of κ. 
Proposition 4a
In the equilibrium steady state without rollover and κ > 0,Ŝ B >Ŝ L andŜ B ,Ŝ L are continuous functions of κ near 0.
The continuity property holds because the SPF is continuous in the verification cost κ and is a straight line when κ = 0. Because the utility function U is strictly quasiconcave, the optimal point where the iso-utility curve is tangent to the SPF is continuous in a neighborhood of κ = 0.
When there is no loan rollover, entrepreneurs are always searching for a bank to finance their project and banks are always searching to finance an entrepreneur. Their respective utilities are
where ω(b) and x(b) are given in (11).
Conditions for the no rollover equilibrium
The terms of the loans are (b, T ), the debt payment and the maximum length of time for rolling over the loan. In the steady state with no rollover, T = 0. The optimality of no rollover will be established below. The value of b determines the shares of the lender and of the borrower in the total return which is the surplus from the match. As specified in the description of the model (Section 2), banks and entrepreneurs choose b in order to maximize the utility function U(S B , S L ) on the payoff possibility set. The optimization problem has always a solution because the payoff set is bounded and U is continuous.
We now take b as given and show that loan contracts (b, T ) with T > 0 are suboptimal. By an abuse of notation and for this discussion only, we write the payoffs as functions 7 of T . If the loan is extended until T , the payoff to the borrower and the lender are
Using (13),
An extension of the loan reduces the payoff of the borrower because he receives nothing while the loan is extended, and he is delayed in getting back to searching for the financing of a new project.
When T increases from 0 to ∞, the point (S B (T ), S L (T )) moves on a curve with slope η,
That locus is therefore the segment of a straight line which is represented in Figure 2 by SK, where the coordinates of the point K are (S B (∞), S L (∞)). At the point S, the payoff allocation maximizes the function U(S B , S L ) on the convex payoff possibility set. That set has a tangent at S with slope σ(b) which is also tangent to the indifference curve at the point S. The tangent separates the indifference curve and a neighborhood of S in the payoff set. Any point on the tangent is strictly inferior to the point S. The segment SK is also to the left of the indifference curve at S if and only if
This condition is necessary and sufficient for all contracts (b, T ) with T > 0 to be strictly sub-optimal 8 . We have proven the following result.
Lemma 1
The steady state without rollover is an equilibrium if and only if η(b) ≥ σ(b), or
whereb is the debt payment in the equilibrium without rollover, and θ(b) has been defined in (12).
The proposition calls for some comments. First, the right-hand side of (18) is the slope of the payoff set and is strictly negative in an equilibrium because the frontier of the set is continuously differentiable and the indifference curve has a strictly negative slope at the equilibrium. A sufficient condition for the inequality is that the numerator is positive on the left-hand side. In this case, the expected return for the lender of rolling over the loan, λy is smaller than µx(b) which is the value of one unit of loanable fund in the equilibrium and is equal to the expected return per unit of time from meeting a new entrepreneur with a new project. In Figure 2 , the segment SK has a negative slope. Both borrower and lender are worse off if the loan is rolled over.
The condition λy <μx(b) is sufficient for an equilibrium with no rollover, but it is not necessary. Such an equilibrium may be feasible even if the lender's return from rolling over, λy, is greater than calling off the loan and switching to the search for a new entrepreneur. Rolling over the loan increases the payoff of the lender, but it decreases the payoff of the borrower. One can see in Figure 2 that under the condition of Lemma 1 the payoff allocation at the point K, with perpetual rollover, is Pareto dominated by an allocation on the frontier, with no rollover and higher debt payment b. In other terms, the lender could get a higher payoff with loan rollover, but there is a better contract (for him and the lender) with no rollover and higher debt payment. In Lemma 1, the debt paymentb must be the equilibrium value for the indifference curve of U to be tangent to the payment possibility set.
Condition (18) in Lemma 1 provides an upper-bound on the output of the long-term project, which can be rewritten
In this expression,
is the mean output of the short-term project net of the verification cost. The verification cost alters the terms of the comparison between the long-term and the short-term project: at the time of the decision about the long-term project, the verification cost is sunk. But the verification cost has a positive expected value for a new match that is obtained by searching. In order to take this effect into account, we introduce the following threshold values for y.
Definition 2
Letȳ(κ,b) and y(κ, b * ) be defined by
These values extend those in Definition 1 whereȳ =ȳ(0, b) =μζ/λ, and y = y(0, b). When verification is costly the threshold values are lower than when κ = 0.
In an equilibrium, the slope of the contract possibility frontier, −1 + κθ(b) in Lemma 1, is equal to the slope of the indifference curve, which is equal to −x(b)/ω(b). Using this substitution in (19), we have the following result.
Proposition 5
For any κ > 0, the steady state with no rollover is an equilibrium if and only if
The cost of information lowers the critical value of y (above which rolling over is privately efficient), because of two effects. In the first, the information cost lowers the value of any match and thus increases the value of the continuation of a loan in an established match with no new information cost to be paid, in comparison to searching for new opportunities in which information cost may occur. This effect is found in the expression ofȳ(κ,b). The second effect takes place through the incentive to reduce the information cost on the margin. It is measured by the multiplier 1 − κθ(b)/(2 − κθ(b)) and depends on the density of the short-term return z near the debt payment b below which the information cost is paid.
The steady state equilibrium with rollover
We consider the steady state where banks, if they find after verification that the project is long-term, they roll over the loan until the project generates a payoff. From Proposition 3 in Section 4.1, all that payoff goes to the lender. The entrepreneur would prefer to quit the long-term project in which he gets nothing, but he has entered a firm commitment at the time the contract was signed when the loan was granted, and he must pay his debt.
In that steady state, the stock of loans, M * , is determined by the equality between inflows and outflows as we have seen in equation (6). Recall that in that steady state, µ * <μ.
The surplus possibility frontier and the equilibrium
If the loan is extended until time T , the payoffs to the borrower and the lender satisfy relations as in (14):
where b * is the debt payment, and U * B , U * L are the utilities of searching borrowers and lenders, in the equilibrium. When the rollover is perpetual, T = ∞ and these expressions take the form
Since
the surplus possibility frontier is defined by the equations (22) where b is arbitrary and U * B , U * L are substituted by the values in (23):
When b increases, the point of coordinates (S * B (b), S * L (b)) moves Northwest on the SPF represented in Figure 3 . The equilibrium debt payment b * maximizes the utility
) on the SPF. In Figure 3 , the SPF with no rollover is represented by the dashed curve. One can see that the surplus possibility set with rollover includes the corresponding set with no rollover. This property, which will be shown below, does not mean that the present value of the surplus is higher. Indeed, because of the lower probability of matching, (µ * <μ), the utilities of searching agents will be shown to be lower (Proposition 7).
The slope of the SPF has the same algebraic expression as the SPF with no rollover:
As in the previous case, the slope of the SPF is smaller than one, in absolute value, because of the verification cost and we have the following result.
Proposition 4b
In the equilibrium steady state with rollover and κ > 0, S * B > S * L and S * B , S * L are continuous functions of κ near 0.
Conditions for the rollover equilibrium
As in the case with no rollover, differentiating the expressions in (21) with respect to the maximum length of the loan T ,
In the current steady state, the loan contracts have T = ∞. When T is finite and decreases to 0, the point of coordinates (S B (T ), S L (T )) moves on a segment S * K * in Figure 3 . At the pointK, there is no rollover. The payoffs of the borrower and of the lender are then equal to S B (b) and S L (b). The slope of the segment S * K * is
Lemma 2 The steady state with perpetual rollover is an equilibrium if and only if γ(b * ) ≤ σ(b * ), where γ(b * ) is defined in (27), and b * is the equilibrium value of the debt payment.
The point K * represents the payoffs of a contract with no rollover in the steady state with rollover. By definition, it is on the frontier of contracts with no rollover. (The value of b * is in general different from the one that maximizes U in the steady state with no rollover). The coordinates of the optimal point S * are (S * B , S * L ) given in (24).
Proposition 6
For any κ > 0, the steady state with rollover is an equilibrium if and only if
Comparing the steady state equilibria
The next statement extends Proposition 2 to the case of verification cost.
Proposition 7
There is some strictly positiveκ such that if κ <κ, Proposition 2 holds.
The result follows immediately from a continuity argument using Proposition 2 and Propositions 4a and 4b.
Imperfect information without commitment
It is now assumed that if verification has taken place and it has shown that the project is long-term, borrower and lender bargain again about the length of the match and the distribution of the payoff. Because both parties have perfect information after the verification, a contract maximizes the sum of the surplus of the borrower and the lender. Let X(T ) be this total surplus as a function of the length of the match:
where U B and U L are the utilities of searching borrowers and lenders in the equilibrium. The function X(T ) is monotone in T and its optimal value is either 0 or λy−ρ(U B +U L ). The curves for the steady state with no rollover (Figure 2 ) are in dotted lines. For the equilibrium with perpetual rollover, the probability of a match, µ, is set, arbitrarily, at half the value of the steady state with no rollover. The surplus possibility frontier (SPF) is higher with rollover but since the probability of a match is lower, the expected discounted utilities of future matches is lower. The equilibrium in the steady state with perpetual rollover is the point S * . When loans are extended up to the maximum time T , the surplus allocation moves on the segment S * K * with T = ∞ at the point S * . The match is continued only if the productivity of the long-term project is greater than the utility from entering a new search by both parties. The value of that search depends on the equilibrium of the economy and it is higher when all agents go back to search instead of continuing a long-term project. In that case, the sum of the utilities U B and U L does not depend on the transfer between borrower and lender, but it depends on the debt payment b which affects the probability of the costly verification in a match. We have
When there is no commitment, (i) the steady state with no rollover is an equilibrium if and only if y <ȳ(κ,b),
(ii) the steady state with rollover is an equilibrium if and only if y > y(κ, b * ),
where y(κ, b * ) andȳ(κ,b) are defined in Definition 2.
The difference between the cases of commitment (Proposition 5) and no commitment (Proposition 8) is illustrated in Figure 4 . The lowering of the debt payment b reduces the mean verification cost and introduces an incentive effect when there is commitment and the lender can recoup the smaller loss on short-term projects with the capture of the entire payoff of long-term projects. This incentive effect lowers the threshold values of y that determine the type of equilibrium with respect to the case of no commitment where the lender cannot recoup any short-term shortfall. In the case of no commitment, there is no incentive effect, but the threshold values are lower than under perfect information because the verification cost reduces the expected gain from searching in comparison with the gain from an established match.
Conclusion
In further research, we will investigate the dynamics of our model, and the interaction between the stock of outstanding loan commitments, the stock of lenders' liquid funds, and the flow of new loans. This interaction will operate through the search technology. A key feature in the present model is the individual's choice between continuing a match or terminating it in order to search for a new (and better) match. This analysis of this mechanism should be extended when learning takes place in an established match and for other models than in the credit market. Figure 3 . At the pointK, there is no rollover. The payoffs of the borrower and of the lender are then equal to S B (b) and S L (b). The slope of the segment S * K * is
Lemma 3 The steady state with perpetual rollover is an equilibrium if and only if γ(b * ) ≤ σ(b * ), where γ(b * ) is defined in (25), and b * is the equilibrium value of the debt payment.
The point K * represents the payoffs of a contract with no rollover in the steady state with rollover. By definition, it is on the frontier of contracts with no rollover. (The value of b * is in general different from the one that maximizes U in the steady state with no rollover). The coordinates of the optimal point S * are (S * B , S * L ) given in (19).
Proposition 5
Equilibrium without rollover
Lemma 3
The steady state with perpetual rollover is an equilibrium if and only if γ(b * ) ≤ σ(b * ), where γ(b * ) is defined in (30), and b * is the equilibrium value of the debt payment.
The point K * represents the payoffs of a contract with no rollover in the steady state with rollover. By definition, it is on the frontier of contracts with no rollover. (The value of b * is in general different from the one that maximizes U in the steady state with no rollover). The coordinates of the optimal point S * are (S * B , S * L ) given in (25).
Proposition 6
These values extend those in Definition 1 whereȳ =ȳ(0, b) =μζ/λ and y = y(0, b). When verification is costly the threshold values are lower than when κ = 0.
In an equilibrium, the slope of the contract possibility frontier, −1 + J in Lemma 2, is equal to the slope of the indifference curve, which is equal to −x(b)/ω(b). Using this substitution in (20), we have the following result.
Proposition 4
The cost of information lowers the critical value of y (above which rolling over is privately efficient), because of two effects. In the first, the information cost lowers the value of any match and thus increases the value of the continuation of a loan in an established match with no new information cost to be paid, in comparison to searching for new opportunities in which information cost may occur. This effect is found in the expression in brackets that measures the expected output from a short-term project net of mean information cost. The second effect takes place through the incentive to reduce the information cost on the margin. It depends on the density of the short-term return z near the debt payment b below which the information cost is paid.
The steady state equilibrium with rollover
We consider the steady state where banks, if they find after verification that the project is long-term, roll over the loan until the project generates a payoff. From Proposition 3 in Section 4.1, all that payoff goes to the lender. The entrepreneur would prefer to quit the long-term project in which he gets nothing, but he is committed to stay and "pay his debt" by the contract that was signed when the loan was granted.
17
Definition 2 Letȳ(κ,b) and y(κ, b * ) be defined by
Proposition 5
For any κ > 0, the steady state with no rollover is an equilibrium if and only if The cost of information lowers the critical value of y (above which rolling over is privately efficient), because of two effects. In the first, the information cost lowers the value of any match and thus increases the value of the continuation of a loan in an established match with no new information cost to be paid, in comparison to searching for new opportunities in which information cost may occur. This effect is found in the expression ofȳ(κ,b). The second effect takes place through the incentive to reduce the information cost on the margin. It is measured by the multiplier 1 − κθ(b)/(2 − κθ(b)) and depends on the density of the short-term return z near the debt payment b below which the information cost is paid.
The steady state equilibrium with rollover
We consider the steady state where banks, if they find after verification that the project is long-term, roll over the loan until the project generates a payoff. From Proposition 3 in Section 4.1, all that payoff goes to the lender. The entrepreneur would prefer to
16
The case of perfect information is identical with that of no commitment and κ = 0. Since searching agents have the same utility, we prove that the sum of the utilities of searching agents is higher in the steady state with no rollover. Using (9), with
Under the condition of the proposition, λy <μζ. Since µ * <μ, it follows immediately that ρU * <μζ = ρÛ .
Likewise, the sum of the utilities of committed agents, u * , is equal to
which is smaller thanÛ because U * <Û .
Proposition 3
Using the notation of the text where h(z) is the payment to the lender if the project produces immediately z and δ the payment if the project produces eventually y, the payoff of the loan to the lender is are independent of h and δ and G 1 ≥ 0 if ρ ≥ ρ.
In an efficient contract, h(z) and δ maximize the payoff to, say, the lender subject to a given payoff for the borrower, or equivalently the sum of the payoffs. Omitting constant terms, we need to find h(z) and δ to maximize 
